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Abstract
1 
This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate 
and pool risk by using a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, 
the voluntary contributions mechanism and the risk pooling game; applied in six 
capital cities in Latin America. The results suggest that: (i) on average, the 
propensity to trust and cooperate among Latin Americans is remarkably similar to 
that found in other regions of the world; (ii) expectations about the behavior of 
other players are the main driver of trust, reciprocity and cooperation; and (iii) 
behaviors involving socialization, trust and cooperation are closely 
interconnected.  
  
                                                 
1 Cárdenas: Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota; Chong and Ñopo: Research Department, 
Inter-American Development Bank. Sebastian Calónico, Natalia Candelo and Sandra Polanía contributed to the 
project during important stages of it. A collaborative effort like this required the support of many colleagues, among 
them we would like to thank Martin Benavides, Juan Jose Díaz, Nestor Gandelman, Saul Keifman, Nathan 
Lederman, Giorgina Piani and Arodys Robles; and their fieldwork teams in the different cities of our project. Jeffrey 
Carpenter provided insightful comments to the experimental design. Lucas Higuera provided research assistance.   4
  
1.  Introduction: The Problem of Collective Action 
 
The puzzle of cooperation among humans remains a central and relevant question. In 2005 the 
magazine Science listed “How Did Cooperative Behavior Evolve?” as one of the Top 25 most 
relevant scientific puzzles to be solved during the next quarter century. Regardless of place, time 
or income group, cooperation and collective action have constituted a major part of humans’ 
daily life. From the organization of hunters and gatherers to global warming and traffic, the 
tragedy of the commons and the dilemma of cooperation continue to affect societies’ well-being. 
Humans have devised multiple forms of correcting losses from problems of collective action by 
harnessing the conflict between individual and social outcomes through incentives, in the form of 
norms and laws. A significant number of social interactions involve potential losses of efficiency 
due to externalities or public good provision problems. As a result, one inevitable outcome is that 
some individuals free ride on others. When there is lack of trust such free-riding is exacerbated, 
thus eliminating opportunities to produce socially efficient outcomes and accentuating 
inequalities in the distribution of outcomes.  
Free-riding and lack of coordination are problems that communities face in their daily 
lives, and when the State fails, they attempt to solve these collective action problems in multiple 
ways. Households contribute labor to starting or maintaining local projects that benefit their 
neighborhood, and neighborhoods contribute to local funds to pay for security or playgrounds 
maintenance. Childcare, recreation parks, water provision, street cleaning, are all examples of 
projects where groups provide a public good through private provision. There are also activities 
where groups organize to face other kinds of problems different from collective action. That is 
the case of facing risk and the possibility of risk-pooling, joining efforts or pooling payoffs when 
under uncertainty. Risks involve credit, natural disasters, political violence, and crime, among 
others. In such cases the formation of groups to face risk involves a collective action problem in 
itself, and the outcome can spread the payoffs throughout the group.  
The possibility of cooperation within a group is determined by multiple causes that the 
literature has identified in theoretical and empirical studies. One of the most debated and 
inconclusive factors is group heterogeneity, and there exist multiple explanations both for and 
against heterogeneity as a factor in explaining collective action. While some argue that 
heterogeneity brings the required additional incentives for a small subgroup to be interested in 
providing the public good (Olson, 1965; and Bergstrom, Blume and  Varian, 1986), others claim   5
that heterogeneity makes it difficult for groups to agree on solutions to problems (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000). 
Cooperating or forming groups to produce a group beneficial outcome is usually costly. 
Sometimes it involves a coordination game where each individual would benefit more if 
everyone else behaves accordingly, and the payoffs drive individuals towards the best outcome 
without conflicts between individual and group interests. Other times it is a collective action 
game where the individual strategy would be not to cooperate although everyone in the group 
would benefit if everyone cooperated. In either case the group needs to find the conditions under 
which individuals can make these costly decisions in ways that yield benefits from group-
oriented activity. These conditions include several behavioral aspects of the problem. For 
instance, individuals may make decisions based on their sense of group affiliation, social 
distance or sympathy towards others in the group. Their personal evaluation of the benefits and 
costs of forming a group or cooperating in a collective action dilemma may be mediated by their 
expectations of what they believe the others would do, and by their valuation of the distributional 
and efficiency consequences of their actions.  
Solving the prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, or any collective action 
dilemma requires individuals to trust their interacting partners. Trusting others under incomplete 
contracts, however, involves the possibility that the trusting action returns no benefits from the 
trustees creating net losses for the trusting person. If the trustees reciprocate, the group increases 
the social net welfare. If the game is repeated, players can engage in a virtuous cycle of trust and 
reciprocity, building a reputation for being trusting and trustworthy and collecting information 
about the trust and trustworthiness of the others in the group (Ostrom, 1998). If the game is 
played only once, players could still be willing to cooperate if the institutions and personal 
characteristics provide sufficient positive information for the person to engage in-group oriented 
behavior. 
The uncertainty of the intentions and actions of the other players is a crucial part of the 
problem. Individuals may have information about past actions of specific individuals or more 
general patterns of past behavior by groups, as well as have information about social norms that 
usually guide the behavior of those interacting with them. Nevertheless, uncertainty remains. 
Therefore understanding the willingness to trust, cooperate or engage in costly group oriented   6
behavior involves understanding individuals’ risk preferences (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 
Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov, 2006). 
Free riding and coordination problems have been studied by sociologists, psychologists, 
and more recently by economists. Research in experimental economics involves the use of highly 
controlled experiments with relatively small groups of individuals whose members are typically 
given a particular sum of money and are allowed to invest in a group exchange or keep the 
money.  If the money is invested, the returns will depend on what the group as a whole invests. 
The experiment is designed so that the private return from keeping the money exceeds the 
private return from the group exchange. However, the social return of the group exchange is 
higher than keeping the money. This game yields a dominant strategy of contributing zero to the 
group exchange and hoping that others invest in the group exchange even though that is not an 
optimal allocation (Andreoni, 1988, and Marwell and Ames, 1979).  In other words, experiments 
try to resemble cooperation and related dilemmas faced by individuals as predicted by economic 
theory.  
In general, the key results related to that type of experiments may be grouped in two. 
First, it appears that economic theory overestimates the prevalence of free riding. In fact, even 
though experiments find that outcomes are closer to the free riding result than the Pareto-
efficient outcome, experiments show that individuals still contribute more than would be implied 
by pure self-interest (Rabin, 1993; Andreoni, 1995). This is particularly true in one-shot, non-
repeated games, which lends relatively little support to a rather strong version of the free riding 
hypothesis (Dawes and Thaler, 1998).  Similarly, a second result is that violations of dominant 
strategies diminish with repetition and with game experience (Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker, 
1988; Kim and Walker, 1984, others). The findings above have led researchers to search for a 
number of possible explanations, typically in the form of so-called kindness, reputation, and 
confusion by individuals (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997). 
This paper attempts to study the micro foundations and mechanisms that may affect the 
possibility of collective action and group formation for different social groups, based on a field 
approach, using survey and experimental methods. This approach focuses on the behavioral 
aspects of the collective action problem, enriched by the social and economic contexts in which 
micro interactions take place. This involves the direct observation of individuals when facing 
problems of trust, collective action and uncertainty, under different levels of social heterogeneity   7
and exclusion. The experimental design of this project captures some of the key dimensions of 
the problem of collective action, making it possible to extract lessons about group-oriented 
behavior in Latin America. Next we turn to presenting the key elements of such experimental 
design. 
 
2.  Experimental Set-Up 
 
We aim at studying the interaction between social exclusion and collective action in Latin 
America using a field experimental approach. To do this, we collected a representative sample of 
individuals from different cities in the region and asked them whether they would be willing to 
participate in a set of experiments that involved economic incentives.  In all, our full sample 
covers individuals from all backgrounds, socio-economic levels, age cohorts, and genders from 
Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San Jose.  For each city we selected a 
team of researchers with experience in survey and field methods. To guarantee homogeneity in 
the application of our experimental protocols, the researchers in charge of each city participated 
in a training workshop at the launching of this project.
2 In this workshop all the implementation 
and related fieldwork details, such as the sampling procedures, the timing of the actions 
(invitations, pre-survey, experiments, post-surveys), the elements within the experimental 
sessions and the construction of the questionnaires, were agreed upon and homogenized. Not 
only did each survey team agreed upon sampling more than 500 participants, but also to conduct 
around 25 experimental sessions with the participants.
3 With the sampling quotas defined, the 
first step in the fieldwork consisted of inviting individuals to the experimental sessions. The 
individuals were asked to the sessions such that at least three sessions per city were made only 
with individuals from high-income strata; at least other three sessions were conducted only with 
individuals from low-income strata; and the rest combined individuals from all strata. Around 30 
individuals were invited for each session, under the assumption that around one-third of them 
would not show up to the session and hence each experimental session could run with around 20 
participants 
                                                 
2 The training workshop was held in Bogota at the beginning of 2007. 
3 The samples were selected in the cities based on a stratified random sample. The strata were chosen on the basis of 
education, average family income of the districts or the territorial units that conform each city (in either terciles, 
quartiles or quintiles, depending on data availability), gender and age (with four age groups: 17-27, 28-38, 39-59 and 
60-72). The goal of the sampling procedure was to obtain empirical distributions of individuals within these 
combinations resembling those of the populations in the cities. After the fieldwork we computed expansion factors 
(weights) for all the observations to alleviate minor sampling problems.   8
The individuals participating in the experiments were invited some days before the 
experimental sessions, and at the time of the invitation the individuals were asked a set of basic 
demographic questions needed to fulfill the sampling quotas described above. The invited 
participants were additionally promised a show-up fee and received information about the 
expected gains from their participation in the experiments. The day before each experimental 
session the invited participants were reminded of the invitation with a phone call or home visit, 
and transportation was arranged or discussed. On the day of the sessions the participants were 
welcomed by the experimental teams in each city, and the sessions started at the time agreed 
upon. After the experiments were conducted, the participants were asked to fill out a survey 
collecting additional socio-demographic information and inquiring about their attitudes, beliefs 
and preferences regarding the issues of social exclusion, discrimination, minorities and pro-
social norms. To reduce the possibilities of idiosyncratic measurement error due to individuals’ 
reading abilities, the surveys were administered by the monitors of the experiments and 
supported by a group of pollsters specially trained for this purposes. After the surveys were filled 
out completely the payoffs from the experiments were computed and the participants received 
their payments 
As one of the main goals of the study is to observe the effect of social heterogeneity on 
individuals’ decisions; the information about socio-economic composition of the groups in each 
particular session was made as salient and clear as possible. The participants met throughout the 
session in one room where they were able to see each other, although they were not allowed to 
communicate during the session. With the development of the sessions, the participants received 
information about their peers, depending on the particular activity. 
More than 3,100 people participated in 148 sessions in six cities, providing a unique data 
set that combines detailed socioeconomic and demographic data with behavioral data from their 
decisions during the experiments discussed below. Each city team conducted more than 17 
sessions of various group sizes, from 10 to 39 people, and each of these sessions followed the 
same protocol, with the same sequence of activities. This is as of today the most comprehensive 
experimental dataset gathered for Latin America given the number of countries included and the 
replicability of the designs in each city. Table 1 provides basic demographics statistics of the 
sample by city.   9
The interactions among the recruited individuals took place within a controlled setting 
where it was possible to observe how incentives, institutions and norms may affect behavior. The 
experiments were conducted in a manner in which it became possible to measure how the degree 
of group heterogeneity affects individual decisions and group outcomes. The experiments of this 
project are adaptations of previous work developed in the experimental literature.
4  
The experiments applied provide key information on individual behavior and group 
outcomes regarding the possibilities and limitations for collective action in groups, and they 
further provide clues on the motivations and cognitive limitations of decision-making that  may 
help to solve the collective action problem. The experiments ultimately point towards the goal of 
understanding the way in which social heterogeneity and social exclusion affect the possibilities 
for actions that create greater benefits to groups.   
The experimental design was based on four activities (A.1 to A.4) in which participants 
made individual decisions that had economic outcomes for themselves and for the others in the 
group; see Candelo et al. (2007) for details of the protocols used in the four  activities. These 
activities were organized within a session where a group of 10-39 participants gathered in a room 
for two to three.  In brief, the sequence of activities was as follows: 
 
•  Experiment 1 (TRUST GAME): All participants in each session were randomly 
assigned to pairs, half of the participants assuming the role of player 1 and the other half 
player 2. The two types of players were located in different rooms. Identities were never 
revealed, but each player was given information about the demographic characteristics of 
each other: age, gender, education and an indication of socio-economic level of the 
neighborhood from which the player came from (high, medium or low).
5 Both players 
received an endowment, and then player 1 was asked to decide how much of this 
endowment to sent to player 2. The amount sent was triple on its way from player 1 to 
player 2. In the other room, player 2 was asked to decide the amounts to be returned to 
player 1 for each possible offer from player 1. Right before making their decisions, 
individuals were asked to predict the decisions made by the other player.  
                                                 
4 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Binswanger (1980), Holt and Laury (2002), Barr (2003), Marwell and Ames 
(1979), Isaac and Walker (1988), Carpenter et al. (2005), Harrison and List (2004), and Cárdenas (2003).  
5 Such characterization of socio-economic levels of the neighborhoods (districts or territorial units in which the 
cities were divided) was made on the basis of the average family income information that was gathered in the pre-
sampling stage.   10
 
This experimental game allows us to measure the extent to which an individual trusts 
another person of similar or different socio-economic characteristics, and whether the actions 
and characteristics of such individual affect the response of the partner in the game; that is, it 
measures trust and reciprocity. Higher offers by the first individual are interpreted as signals of 
trust, while higher returns from the second palyer are signals of reciprocity. The game theoretical 
prediction of this game is that players 1 send zero offers, as they cannot assure that player 2 will 
return any amount. Replications of this game around the world have shown that people on 
average send half of the initial endowment to players 2, and that the returns from player 2 to 
player 1 generate a net positive return for player 1 of about 10-20 percent of what was originally 
sent.  
 
•  Experiment 2 (VCM): All participants then gathered in a single room and participated in 
a Voluntary Contributions Mechanism or Public Goods game. Each player was given a 
token that could be kept or invested in a group project. If a player kept the token she 
earned a designated amount, say $10. If the player invested the token in the group project, 
her token and those of others in the group account would yield a return of $1 for every 
participant in the group. A player who kept the token also received $1*the number of 
tokens in the group account. Before participants made  make their individual and private 
decision on whether to contribute to the group, the monitor announced verbally and on 
the board the composition of the group: gender, age, education and socio-economic 
composition of the group (i.e., the number of individuals from high, medium and low 
socio-economic neighborhoods). Also, the monitor requested every participant to write 
her/his prediction of the proportion of cooperators.   
 
The public goods or VCM experiment captures a dimension of trust similar to that in the 
Trust Game, but in this case towards a group instead of an individual. It measures the willingness 
to contribute a token to a public good and provide benefits to all group members. The decision to 
contribute to the group increases the benefits for all, but not contributing will always yield 
greater individual payoffs and thus the incentives to free ride. Full cooperation yields greater 
payoffs to everyone than free-riding, and the gains from cooperation increases with the number   11
of players. In the design one player will be indifferent between keeping the token or investing it 
in the group if nine other players had contributed. A key element in the game is that no player 
will know in advance how many would contribute. The players only know general socio-
economic characteristics about the other players right before making the decision. The players 
were also requested to predict how many people would contribute to the group account in order 
to capture players’ expectations.  
 
•  Experiment 3 (3 RISK GAMES): Each player individually made decisions over 3 
games measuring individual attitudes toward risk, ambiguity and losses.  
o  The first stage, measuring risk aversion, offered to the participants known 
probabilities and known outcomes for six 50/50 lotteries that went from a sure 
low payoff to an all-or-nothing higher payoff (the lotteries in between gradually 
increased in expected value and in the spread of the low and high payoff).  
o  The second stage, measuring ambiguity aversion, offered the same payoffs for the 
six lotteries mentioned, but individuals did not know the exact probabilities, as 
they did in the first stage. They only knew that at least 30 percent of the chances 
were for the low payoff and that at least 30 percent were for the high payoff (but 
did not know the exact probabilities)  
o  The third stage, measuring loss aversion, used the same six lotteries with 50/50 
probabilities, but including the possibility of negative payoffs in some cases.
6 
 
The individual risk games were based on three components of risk behavior. These three 
games allow distinguishing risk attitudes in terms of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and loss 
aversion. The first stage measures risk aversion, based on known probabilities and known 
outcomes for six 50/50 lotteries. Choosing lotteries with lower payoffs can be interpreted as 
greater risk aversion. The second stage measures risk ambiguity. The third stage is aimed to 
measure loss aversion.  The purpose of this activity is to generate measures of risk behavior in 
order to link them with trust and cooperative behavior. 
 
                                                 
6 To avoid negative payments for subjects the players were endowed with a fixed amount in this game regardless of 
the gains or losses.   12
•  Experiment 4 (RISK POOLING): Each player chooses whether to form a group to 
share equally the gains from another risk aversion game, or to play the risk aversion game 
individually. Once they decide whether to form a group, the total number of people 
forming the group is announced and they then decide on the risk choice. 
 
The fourth and last activity (risk-pooling game) measures individuals’ willingness to join 
a group and accept an equal distribution of payoffs after again choosing a lottery like those 
available in the first stage of the individual risk games. As in the VCM game, the purpose of this 
game is to explore whether an individual will base her decision to join the group on the socio-
economic composition of the group in the session. Again, players were not allowed to 
communicate and were given only basic information about the composition of the group (age, 
education, gender and socio-economic composition). Notice that in this game the most profitable 
group outcome would be for all players to join the group and choose higher- risk lotteries (at a 50 
percent chance of the high payment, the expected value should yield greater payoffs to everyone 
in the group). 
By the end of the last activity, as previously announced, the monitor randomly selected 
one of the activities to be paid. While one monitor calculated individual earnings and privately 
called each of the participants, the rest of monitors interviewed each participant, filling out an 
individual survey with detailed information on socio-economic characteristics and attitudes, 
belief and preferences towards various dimensions of social exclusion. 
 
3.   Socio-Demographics, Beliefs and Preferences of Individuals 
 
Before turning to the experimental results it is worthwhile to survey the responses of the 
individuals surveyed to a battery of questions on attitudes, beliefs and preferences involving 
trust, collective action and exclusion. Less than half of the individuals in the six cities in the 
project declared participation in organized interest groups. The organizations with the highest 
participation were cultural or athletic groups, in which 1 out of 6 participated, and religious 
groups, in which 1 out of 7 participated. Lima is the city with the lowest participation in these 
organizations, while Bogota and Buenos Aires are the cities with the highest participation. 
Interestingly state-sponsored and ethnic organizations display the lowest participation rates.   13
Individuals were asked to agree or disagree with a battery of statements on the scope and 
scale of the welfare state. Table 3a and 3b show the results, separating the positive statements 
from the negative ones. In general, the positive statements that reached the highest agreement 
had to do with equality of opportunities, lack of discrimination and collective welfare; the 
positive statements that encountered the least agreement involved a tax increase to fund 
assistance to a specific vulnerable group. The least accepted negative statements are related to 
the exclusion of women, Afro-descendants and the indigenous population. In contrast with the 
participation rates in organized interest groups, Lima has the highest average of agreement on 
positive statements, and the lowest on negative statements. 
Approximately one of every three individuals wanted to buy a house but could not do 
so—the leading area of frustration.  The next important activities of this type were obtaining a 
bank loan, studying and working. One of every four individuals fell within those categories. The 
most restrained individuals live in Bogota and Lima where, besides the activities mentioned 
before, retiring, having a savings account and being covered by the social security system are 
also restricted activities. Political activities, such as voting, running for office or belonging to a 
political organization, are the least restricted activities for the six cities in the experiments. 
When asked whether there were circumstances under which individuals felt their rights 
were not respected, the top three rights mentioned from a list of 20 were the opportunity to have 
a decent job, freedom of opinion, and justice and equal treatment under the law. The rights that 
the surveyed individuals felt were less violated had to do with voting (either the right to vote or 
the right to run for office), torture and freedom of association. Montevideo and Lima are the 
cities where the smallest share of respondents believed that at least one of their political rights 
had been violated. As a matter of fact, almost three out of four individuals reported having voted 
in the last presidential elections, and two out of five reported having voted in the last local 
elections. Having a decent job is the most violated social right in the six cities of the project, 
closely followed by not having a sound environment and no having some sort of health 
insurance. In Caracas these last social rights are not the least respected; individuals there report 
that the most violated social right is to social security. When individuals were why they believed 
their rights had not been violated at least once during the last five years, they mentioned lack of 
connections, lack of money and age as the top three reasons. These results are consistent with 
those found in other opinion surveys of the region (e.g., Latinobarometro) and are not different   14
among the cities in the sample. In Caracas, political ideas are an important perceived cause of 
having one’s rights violated.  
The social group that the individuals perceived as being the most vulnerable was, by far, 
the elderly, who were mentioned by almost two-thirds of the individuals surveyed. Around one 
third of the respondents listed children as the most vulnerable group.   
Exploring the notion of social distances, the survey asked individuals to identify causes of 
social conflict. The leading answer was political differences, cited by almost 40 percent,   
followed by income and education differences, cited by around one-third of respondents. In line 
with previous results in this paper, political differences are extremely relevant in Caracas, where 
political differences are seen as more than twice as important as the next most relevant reason for 
conflict.  
 
4.  What Do the Experiments Teach Us?
  
 
The results that follow describe the most relevant and robust findings that emerged from the 
group-level and individual data in the six cities of the experiment. 
 
Finding 1: Latin Americans are willing to trust and cooperate. 
 
Consistent with previous observed experimental behavior, the game theoretical prediction that 
people in the Trust Game (TG) should not send any amount as either player 1 or player 2 is 
rejected. Only 1 out of every 6 of the observed decisions made by the individuals who 
participated as player 1 decided to send 0. The average offer was 43 percent of the initial 
endowment, and the median offer was 50 percent of the initial endowment (in 32 percent of the 
decisions). Recall that social efficiency is maximized when player 1 sends the entire endowment, 
letting player 2 decide over the allocation of the tripled amount. This happened in only 9.6 
percent of the cases, while an additional 13.6 percent sent 75 percent of the initial endowment. 
With respect to players 2, the results also reject the prediction of selfish behavior. Furthermore, 
the results confirm that reciprocity is a major driver of their behavior. Only one out of every five 
players 2 decided to keep the entire amount in their hands after player 1’s decision, and half of 
those who offered a zero return had initially been offered also a zero amount.   
These results differ interestingly across cities, Bogota being the least “trusting” city of the 
set. Not only is player 1’s average offer in Bogota the lowest among the 6 cities, but Bogota is   15
also the only city in which the median offer does not reach 50 percent of the initial endowment 
(in fact, it is only 25 percent).  In addition, almost one third of players 1 in Bogota decided to 
send nothing to their counterparts. At the other extreme, Lima shows the highest average offer 
from players 1.  Regarding players 2, the lowest reciprocity is also found in Bogota as the 
average and median amounts sent back to players 1 are the lowest and the fraction of players 2 
who decided to keep all and send nothing to their pairs are the highest among the six cities. 
Approximately one out of every five participants in the VCM game opted to contribute to 
the public good; Caracas displayed the highest participation rate (47.3 percent) and Bogota the 
lowest (12.3 percent). The other four cities showed similar patterns of contribution 
(approximately 1 out of every 4 participants contributed to the public good in these cities). This 
rejects the zero-contribution hypothesis in this game as well. As has been found in the literature 
elsewhere, individuals do, in fact, cooperate.  
The patterns of contribution in the risk pooling game were somewhat higher than those 
found in the VCM game. In this case, there are clearly two types of cities in terms of risk-
sharing. On the one hand, Bogota and Lima show the lowest willingness to do pool risk, with 
only 38 percent of players doing so. On the other hand, the remaining cities display similar 
patterns of pooling, with more than half of participants opting to pool risk). 
Regarding risk attitudes, individuals in Caracas show the lowest risk aversion, while 
residents of Montevideo are on the other extreme, showing the highest risk aversion (although 
Buenos Aires and San Jose are not far from Montevideo in this regard). The presence of 
ambiguity clearly increases risk aversion with respect to the original setup, especially in Bogota 
and Buenos Aires. Caracas also seems to be the city with the lowest loss aversion, while Buenos 
Aires displays the greatest loss aversion.   
Although Latin Americans indeed trusted and cooperated in the games, they did not do so 
to the maximum possible extent. Had the participants of the games performed at the optimal 
social levels, the total gains of the players would have been 28 percent higher than what was 
actually observed in the Trust game, 42 percent higher in the Voluntary Contribution game and 
26 percent higher (in expected value) in the Risk Pooling game. These percentages provide an 
idea of the magnitude of the social welfare that our societies fail to generate due to limitations on 
trust and willingness to cooperate.  
   16
Finding 2: “Tit-for-Tat” and expectations are important drivers of willingness to trust and 
cooperate among Latin Americans. 
 
Players 1 expecting to be reciprocated made greater offers to players 2, and those players 2 who 
expected greater offers were also willing to return greater amounts to players 1.  In fact, players 
2 were willing to return 2.5 times to players 1 who had offered 100 percent of the initial 
endowment, a rate of return that decreased with the amount sent by players 1. Also, only 12.16 
percent of participants in the role of player 2 predicted that players 1 were going to send 0 
percent of the initial endowment. Slightly more than one third of the players predicted being sent 
50 percent, and 14.06 percent of players 2 predicted that player 1 would send them 100 percent 
of the initial endowment. Bogota and Caracas had the highest shares of players 2 that expected a 
0 percent offer from players 1.  Player 2’s forecasts were remarkably accurate.  
In considering the behavior of the individuals in the Trust Game in terms of their socio-
economic characteristics, those of their pairs, their risk attitudes and their expectations about the 
behavior of their pairs, the latter shows most consistently explains the behavior of the 
individuals. Expectations are not only statistically significant but also behaviorally relevant 
explanatory variables for the amount sent by Player 1 in all cities but San Jose, and for the 
amount sent by Player 2 in all cities.
7 
In the VCM game, the participants predicted that on average 44.46 percent of players in 
each session would contribute to the group account and only 6.77 percent predicted that nobody 
would cooperate in this game. Participants were able to provide a rather accurate prediction of 
the actual rate of cooperation in the VCM game and acted based on a reciprocal strategy. When 
players expected more people to cooperate in the game, they were more likely to cooperate. 
Overall, the predicted fraction of cooperators could map the actual fraction of people 
contributing to the public good, as shown in Figure 1, independently of the participation or 
expectation level of the city (Figure 1a).   
The regressions explaining the behavior of the individuals also show in the VCM case 
that expectations of the contributions of other members are the main driving force of behavior in 
all cities. Interestingly as well, individuals’ attitudes towards risk play no major role in predicting 
their behavior. 
 
                                                 
7 The tables with the results from the regressions explaining the behavior of the individuals in all games are 
available in the Appendix.   17
Finding 3: Socialization, trust and cooperation are remarkably linked for Latin Americans. 
 
During the last activity, the risk-pooling game, on average 45.4 percent of players decided to join 
the risk-pooling group for all sessions, ranging from 11.1 percent to 100 percent of players per 
session. Even though the percentage of individuals who decided to pool risk was high in all 
citie], Bogota and Lima report less than 40 percent average participation in risk pooling per 
session. More interestingly, the fraction of those willing to join a group was highly correlated 
with the fraction of contributors to the group account in the VCM game (Activity 2), as shown in 
Figure 2. Although these games measure different dimensions of group-oriented behavior, both 
might be driven by similar motivations such as in-group or sense of belonging effects. On 
average, groups who showed greater levels of contributions also showed greater levels of group 
formation. In all cities, the regressions exploring the characteristics that explaining the behavior 
of players consistently show strong linkages between the decisions made in the VCM game and 
the Risk Pooling game.   
When looking at trusting behavior by players 1 in the Trust Game it is also observed that 
those who contributed in the public goods game (A.2) sent on average 52.8 percent of their 
endowment, while those who did not contribute sent 39.4 percent. This difference is smaller in 
Lima (2 percent), Montevideo (9 percent) and San Jose (8 percent).  Likewise, the offers sent by 
those who had joined the group in the last activity of risk-pooling (activity 4) were about 10 
percentage points higher than the offers by those not joining the group. A similar pattern is 
confirmed for players 2 in the trust game. Those contributing in the public good returned about 9 
percentage points more to their (player 1) counterparts in the trust game, and those who joined 
the group (A.4) returned about 4 percentage points more to their counterparts.  
 
Finding 4: The other individual and group characteristics that explain trust and willingness to 
cooperate differ greatly across cities.   
 
When trying to explain the amounts sent by Players 1 and the reciprocal responses of Players 2 it 
is found that differences as well as similarities arise across cities. For instance, more educated 
players 1 sent a higher amount to players 2 in Bogota, female players 1 sent less to players 2 in 
Caracas and Lima, and older players 2 returned more to players 1 in Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo.    18
When explaining the decision to contribute the token to the group account as a function 
of game conditions as well as individual and group characteristics, we find results in the same 
vein. Socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals and of the sessions do not seem to play 
important roles in the prediction of cooperation. Older people were more likely to cooperate in 
three of the six cities. In Caracas women were more likely to cooperate in the VCM game, but 
more educated people were less likely to do it. Those who belong to a high socioeconomic level 
were less likely to cooperate in Lima and Montevideo (but the opposite happens in Buenos 
Aires). Larger sessions motivated people to cooperate in this game in Buenos Aires.  
The determinants of the decision of pooling risk are very similar to those of the public 
good game: older people are more likely to pool in three of the six cities as well. Sessions with a 
larger share of women showed more risk pooling in Bogota and Montevideo, although individual 
women were no more likely to pool than men. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper presents the results of a project that experimentally measured trust, reciprocity, 
cooperation and collective action in Latin America. To our knowledge, the resulting data set 
from this project is the most comprehensive to date, not only because of the sampling design 
employed in each city, but also because of the plausibility of the comparison of six different 
cities. In that sense, this is a pioneering effort for the experimental literature in the Latin 
American region. 
The results from the series of experiments reported here provide new evidence on how 
group-oriented behavior can emerge and what factors may help or constrain choices that benefit 
individuals and their groups. As in the previous literature, trust, cooperation and group formation 
are highly correlated. In those groups where the conditions were conducive to trusting others, 
they were also conducive to contributing to a public good or to forming a group to share the 
income from an uncertain lottery. Expectations about behavior of others in each of the games 
were powerful predictors of actual behavior.  
This is of crucial importance for various reasons. If people can predict with some 
accuracy the behavior of those in the same room, based only on a short observation around the 
room and listening to very basic data about the demographics of the group, it means individuals 
do pay attention and condition their group oriented behavior to the immediate context and not   19
only to their individual traits. Secondly, expectations are key informants of economic decisions, 
and as such they can also misguide people towards behavior that is not group-beneficial, 
bringing groups into traps or undesired equilibria. 
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747-65. Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Participants in the Experiments 
Descriptive statistics  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  Montevi
deo  San Jose
Average age  37  40  35  37  41  37 
Percentage  of  female  population  55 53 51 52 55 54 
Percentage  with  public  education  72 82 73 83 90 89 
Percentage working in the public 
Sector  10 14 25 11 17 21 
Percentage  with  social  security  89 66 40 26 78 59 
Parental relationship 
(percentage)               
    Household head  44  43  25  38  45  38 
    Wife/Husband  22  25  26  24  20  23 
    Son/Daughter  25  27  32  30  25  24 
    Other  9  4  17  8  10  14 
Marital status (percentage)               
    Single  34  34  44  36  30  40 
    Formal or Informal Union  48  52  50  51  47  45 
    Divorced, Widow.  18  14  7  13  23  14 
Educational level (percentage)               
   Secondary Incomplete or Less  43  52  55  31  60  59 
   Secondary Complete  27  20  24  36  15  16 
   Tertiary Complete or 
Incomplete  30 28 20 33 25 25 
Socio-economic level 
(percentage) 
             
   Low  47  52  34  59  22  27 
   Middle  38  27  52  25  55  50 
   High  15  20  14  17  23  23 
Sessions               
Number of participants  567  498  488  541  580  415 
Number of sessions  28  25  25  25  28  17 
Size of the group for the smallest 
session 
12  14  14  14  14 
10 
Size of the group for the largest 
session 
29  30  28  32  30 
39 
Average size per session  21  20  20  23  22  27 
  
Table 2. Participation in Groups and Organizations (percentage) 
Group  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose
Religious 20.6  14.8  8.9  14.5  8.9  23.1 
Sportive or cultural  13.6  16.6  20.3  9.4  14.9  9.0 
Charity (Not as beneficiary)  3.4  11.4  8.3  2.0  4.2  3.6 
Educational 8.2  4.6  2.5  6.2  3.3  3.3 
Building association  5.0  7.8  2.7  1.1  8.1  0.7 
Community organization  7.7  2.5  7.1  4.2  5.4  8.4 
Political or Movement Party 0.8  3.5  1.6  1.3  4.9  2.8 
Labor Union  1.8  2.2  2.0  1.1  5.6  2.4 
Environmental management  3.6  1.2  1.7  0.5  1.0  3.3 
Surveillance association  2.5  1.2  0.2  1.3  1.0  2.8 
State sponsored activities  0.6  2.1  0.4  0.1  1.3  1.5 
Other 0.7  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.7  1.8 
Ethnic Organization  0.1  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.2 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents who participate in certain groups or organizations. 
Respondents can report participation in more than one of the organizations listed. 
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Table 3a. Opinions about the Welfare State: Positive 
Statement  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  MontevideoSan Jose
Everyone should have the same opportunities 
to think about any subject  95.8 86.3 93.8 96.5  91.3  92.7 
To diminish discrimination is as important as 
to diminish poverty  86.7 93.8 87.8 91.6  92.1  84.3 
People should worry about other people well 
being  90.7 90.0 86.0 91.6  91.6  92.2 
Certain classes or social groups are responsible 
of the existence of poverty  86.6 88.1 60.9 84.8  78.1  72.9 
The existence of a public social protection 
program helps to prevent hunger and 
malnutrition 
92.9 77.6 81.1 80.5  76.5  77.7 
In a good society, people feels responsible for 
the rest  79.6 84.1 74.6 77.0  84.0  78.7 
Anyone who work hard can go as far as he/she 
wants  84.3 66.6 89.4 90.8  71.1  88.3 
Rich countries have the moral obligation of 
sharing part of their wealth with poor countries 72.3 67.2 69.4 77.2  58.3  69.7 
People have the moral obligation of sharing 
part of their resources with poor people  75.3 65.3 58.2 78.8  57.0  75.5 
Taxes should be raised to support rehabilitation 
programs for alcoholics and drug addicts  49.5 52.1 72.8 68.2  50.5  60.7 
Taxes should be raised to support programs for 
social insertion of young criminals  47.6 41.5 73.2 69.3  44.9  62.8 
Taxes should be raised to give subsidies to the 
poor  52.1 38.2 64.9 62.2  36.5  60.9 
Taxes should be raised to give subsidies to 
indigenous population  36.6 37.8 50.9 51.6  31.3  67.0 
Taxes should be raised to give subsidies to 
Afro-descendants  34.2 27.1 35.9 36.5  21.5  34.7 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement listed. 
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Table 3b. Opinions about the Welfare State: Negative 
 
Statement  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  MontevideoSan Jose
The social protection system of the State 
makes people work less than otherwise  35.0 63.8 42.2 44.3  59.6  47.4 
Certain opinions should be restricted  51.1  43.8  41.0  56.5  50.1  57.1 
In general, poor people do not pay their debts  30.5  48.6  36.0  39.4  48.5  47.3 
Poor people do not make efforts to get out of 
poverty  38.1 33.3 36.0 27.7  41.1  45.2 
Indigenous who want to work should do so in 
tasks according to their race  20.0 13.9 39.1 14.7  13.4  22.3 
Indigenous people are less capable than white 
people of having important positions at work  14.2 21.3 12.4  9.4  19.1  20.8 
Afro-descendants who want to work should do 
so in tasks according to their race  16.7 14.6 26.1  9.6  10.3  17.5 
Women who want to work should do so in 
tasks according to their gender  15.5 11.6 20.3 11.9  12.2  17.9 
Afro-descendants are less capable than white 
people of having important positions at work  11.2 16.5 10.9  6.2  16.2  11.4 
Women are less capable than men of having 
important positions at work  6.3 10.5  11.8  10.6  11.4 11.9 
Spaces reserved to disables are a waste  7.4  3.4  7.8  8.1  5.6  8.3 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement listed. 
 
 
Table 4. Exclusion from Social and Economic Activities 
  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  MontevideoSan Jose
Having one’s own house  43.4  30.0  30.5  45.0  24.1  36.6 
Studying 38.9  14.0  17.9  47.0  13.2  26.1 
Getting a bank loan  35.5  15.1  40.3  28.4  10.2  23.2 
Working 25.5  14.5  16.2  41.3  16.2  21.3 
Having a checking account  26.5  13.0  22.0  38.7  15.4  25.5 
Having health insurance  12.2  11.4  24.4  34.7  10.6  17.2 
Participating in a social security system  22.2  6.2  15.4  21.9  3.6  13.6 
Having a savings or other type of account  10.1  4.7  13.4  17.8  7.0  15.3 
Participating in a pension plan  19.2  3.5  8.8  7.3  4.1  14.0 
Voting 8.0  2.3  3.0  0.8  1.4  8.7 
Participating in a political campaign  5.3  1.3  2.4  5.5  2.2  5.8 
Belonging to a political organization 4.9  1.7  4.3  4.6  1.1  3.6 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents who wanted to participate in the activity listed in preceding 
five years but could not do so.    26
 
 
Table 5. Rights Reported as Not Respected 
 
Rights  Bogota Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima Montevideo San 
Jose 
Political and Civil Rights                   
Freedom of opinion  31.7  29.5  38.2  28.2  26.5  35.2 
Justice and equal treatment to the law  26.4  27.5  25.8  37.8  23.9  26.2 
Freedom of transit  15.5  24.3  22.1  13.4  8.1  12.9 
Freedom of religious beliefs  11.5  8.9  6.0  4.6  5.7  15.5 
Physical freedom  8.2  9.4  8.4  1.6  3.0  7.8 
Freedom to own land  8.6  6.1  10.4  4.6  4.7  14.0 
Freedom of political beliefs  6.4  3.9  21.8  3.0  4.6  10.7 
Voting 5.2  2.0  8.1  0.9  1.7  6.3 
Freedom of association  3.3  1.1  6.2  1.7  2.8  10.6 
Not being tortured  2.0  0.7  3.3  2.3  4.4  n.a. 
Right to run for public office  0.8  0.2  3.0  2.2  0.6  3.7 
Social Rights           
Having a decent and socially useful job  36.0  34.5  23.0  30.8  33.1  30.7 
An appropriate environment  31.6  34.2  14.1  13.2  24.0  21.4 
Health protection  26.8  30.7  16.6  14.5  26.5  21.2 
Not being bothered in one’s home  26.4  27.3  16.0  17.0  27.0  19.7 
An appropriate education  27.3  18.4  16.2  22.8  12.5  20.2 
Social security  17.7  22.7  32.4  18.7  20.2  21.7 
Decent housing  21.1  21.0  16.7  18.3  19.3  31.1 
Free exercise of a job or occupation  16.4  11.3  7.4  5.4  13.0  13.0 
To decide how many children to have and when 3.1  2.8  3.7  2.5  6.1  9.6 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents whose listed right was not respected in the last five years. 
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Table 6. Explanation of Why Rights Were Limited or Not Respected 
Reason  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose 
Not having money  35.2  15.5  16.8  22.1  17.3  18.9 
Age 32.7  18.5  21.9  13.3  15.5  17.5 
Not having contacts or connections  27.8  21.2  18.0  11.1  16.1  16.5 
Education 29.7  5.6  13.3  18.2  6.9  18.5 
Physical appearance  7.5  9.7  5.3  11.0  7.3  8.2 
The way you speak  10.7  7.3  3.6  5.3  7.3  8.0 
Political ideas  6.0  6.1  18.2  2.1  7.3  7.0 
The way you dress  9.5  3.9  7.1  3.2  5.1  8.0 
Gender 6.2  4.2  2.8  6.8  5.8  7.5 
Religion 5.9  3.1  1.1  2.9  1.2  8.0 
Skin color  0.9  2.7  2.0  4.1  2.2  2.9 
Coming from a region/province of the country  2.1  0.8  0.0  2.5  1.5  1.8 
Disability condition  1.8  2.1  1.1  0.2  1.7  0.9 
Ethnic origin  0.7  0.0  0.4  1.5  0.5  0.4 
Sexual preference  0.6  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.7 
Being foreign  0.0  0.6  1.5  0.0  0.5  2.3 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents who felt her/his rights have been limited or not respected for 
the reason listed.  
 
 
Table 7. Perception of Most Unprotected Groups 
 
Most Vulnerable Groups  Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo  San Jose 
Elderly  54.0 76.1 64.8 71.2 70.6 70.7 
Children  30.6 29.9 37.3 37.1 40.6 24.5 
Disabled  19.4 37.7 29.2 29.6 34.8 24.4 
Poor  28.4 28.2 35.6 26.3 24.9 26.7 
Persons with HIV  21.8 17.1 22.0 22.6 24.2 19.7 
Unemployed  28.6 15.4 21.7 17.0 17.9 16.2 
Members of indigenous groups  16.5 20.3 20.9 15.2  4.1  41.5 
Single mothers  23.6 5.7  9.4 25.7 14.2 12.0 
Less educated people  12.4 17.7 13.1  9.2  21.5  9.4 
Displaced by political violence  33.0 0.8  4.7  2.1  0.0  7.0 
Women  6.5 7.1  13.9  11.9 8.2 16.7 
Young  6.4 8.7  13.1  5.2 12.8  10.4 
Homosexuals  7.3 2.3 5.7  10.4 8.1 9.6 
Ex-combatants  2.7 9.3 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 
People from other regions/provinces  3.2 2.0 1.4 8.4 6.9 2.5 
Afro-descendants  3.4 1.4 1.3 3.9 4.4 2.7 
Those without contacts/connections  1.8 2.0 0.9 2.8 5.0 1.4 
Foreigners  0.3 3.7 4.6 0.8 1.1 4.4 
Non-Catholics  0.1 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.4 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents citing the listed group as most unprotected in their city. 
Respondents can choose three groups.    28
 
 
Table 8. Perceptions of Differences among People that Generate the Most Conflict 
Differences  Bogota Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  Montevideo San 
Jose 
Political difference  33.4 42.4 70.0 40.5  52.0  34.8 
Income difference  37.9 37.2 22.9 30.5  33.9  26.0 
Difference in the level of education  33.8 31.2 27.8 31.0  41.1  25.9 
People employed and unemployed  32.9 32.3 28.0 22.9  33.2  19.6 
Ethnic and racial difference  18.5 30.8 24.4 39.4  25.0  26.9 
Religious difference  26.4 34.5 13.4 20.2  18.3  35.1 
Age difference  22.1 17.9 27.3 26.5  27.9  27.4 
Difference between countries  12.1 20.2 20.0 22.1  18.2  21.6 
Homosexuals and heterosexuals  15.7 10.8 19.8 15.8  11.3  20.6 
Difference in gender  13.3 9.2 15.4  19.2  10.5 30.8 
People with and without disabilities  7.8 18.3 14.8  10.5  15.9 13.0 
Difference between displaced and not displaced 32.0 0.0  6.2 5.6  0.0  0.0 
People having contacts and others having not  8.9 8.9 7.5 9.2  8.7  9.9 
Difference between people from other regions  5.2 6.4 2.5 6.7  4.2  8.4 
Note: The table reports the percentage of respondents citing the listed differences as those that create the most 
conflict. Respondents can choose three differences. 
   29
Table 9. Trust Game, Basic Results 
 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  Monte-
video  San Jose
Player 1                   
Players  276  244  236  268  284  209 
                    
Offered 0%  32.1  11.6  6.0  9.9  6.9  7.9 
Offered 25%  25.2  31.4  37.4  24.5  36.8  34.4 
Offered 50%  24.3  34.0  34.1  35.9  32.0  35.1 
Offered 75%  12.8  11.3  16.5  17.0  18.9  9.8 
Offered 100%  5.6  11.7  6.0  12.7  5.4  12.8 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                    
Average Offer  33.6  45.0  44.8  49.5  44.8  46.2 
Median Offer  25%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50% 
                    
Player 2                   
Players  286  252  243  273  295  216 
Observations  1,430  1,260  1,215  1,365  1,475  1,080 
                    
Average return if                    
Player 1 offered:                   
Offered 0%  15.7  16.9  32.2  29.0  23.7  27.5 
Offered 25%  18.7  25.0  34.6  34.5  30.6  26.7 
Offered 50%  19.8  28.3  36.1  33.9  29.7  26.3 
Offered 75%  18.8  29.6  34.5  32.4  29.7  24.6 
Offered 100%  19.3  32.2  37.8  34.0  29.4  25.4 
                    
Returned nothing (%)  33.68  14.86  7.89  9.25  13.27  16.58 
Returned everything 
(%)  0.73  0.99  4.19  2.21  0.95  3.65 
                    
Average return  18.4  26.4  35.1  32.8  28.6  26.1 
Median return  14%  25%  28%  28%  25%  20% 
Note: For players 1, the table reports the number of players per city, the percentage of players who sent the listed 
offer and the average and median offer per city. For players 2, the table reports the average return depending on 
the five possible initial offers from player 1, the percentage of observations that returned nothing and that 
returned everything and the average and median return per city. The number of observations in players’ 2 
information corresponds to the five observations that report every player 2, each one corresponding with an 
intended return amount that depends on the five possible initial offers by  player 1. 
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Table 10.  VCM, Risk Pooling and Risk Preferences, Basic Results 
 
   Bogotá Buenos 
Aires  Caracas Lima  Montevideo San 
José 
VCM                   
% of players who contributed to group account 12.3  23.1  47.3  24.2  25.1  24.3 
Average % of contributors per session  11.8  22.0  42.3  21.9  24.4  25.5 
                    
% of sessions with no contribution  21.4  4  4  0  0  0 
Median % of contributors per session  9.3  21.7  44.4  20.0  24.1  23.8 
Maximum % of contributors per session  45.0  61.9  73.7  38.9  42.9  80.0 
                    
Risk pooling                   
% of players who pooled risk  38.4  53.7  53.0  38.7  52.1  50.2 
Average % of risk-poolers per session  40.3  50.6  55.6  37.9  53.0  56.0 
                    
Minimum % of risk-poolers per session  13.6  21.4  25  13.3  11.8  11.1 
Median % of risk-poolers per session  42.0  50.0  52.4  35.7  53.3  57.1 
Maximum % of risk-poolers per session  60.0  70.0  94.7  55.6  78.6  100 
                    
Risk preferences (% of players)                   
Low risk aversion  15.3  14.7  32.6  19.4  12.9  21.4 
Mid risk aversion  35.7  31.2  24.6  31.2  30.2  24.9 
High risk aversion  49.0  54.1  42.8  49.4  56.9  53.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                    
Low risk aversion in presence of ambiguity  12.7  10.5  26.6  16.5  10.3  19.0 
Mid risk aversion in presence of ambiguity  27.1  28.1  30.1  30.6  29.8  26.3 
High risk aversion in presence of ambiguity  60.1  61.4  43.3  52.9  59.9  54.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                    
Low loss aversion  28.9  20.1  40.3  35.6  30.3  30.1 
Mid loss aversion  25.6  29.0  28.7  24.6  35.7  26.6 
High loss aversion  45.5  50.9  31.0  39.9  34.0  43.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Note: The table reports the basic results for the VCM game, the risk pooling game and the risk preferences of 
participants. The six lotteries of Experiment 3 were grouped by pairs (low, mid and high); figures represent the 
percentage of players who chose the corresponding group of lotteries. 
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Figure 1. Expectations and Actual Cooperation in VCM 
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 Figure 1a. Expectations and Actual Cooperation in VCM, by City 
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Figure 2. Correlation between VCM and Risk Pooling 















0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0
















































































 Figure 2a. Correlation between VCM and Risk Pooling, by City 
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Table 11. Results Trust Game, Player 1 
   Dependent variable: initial offer from Player 1 (% of initial endowment) 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose 
Participant’s characteristics                   
0.00176 -0.0021 -0.0019  0.0009  0.00001  0.00419** Player’s age 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
0.05671 -0.04017  -0.15381** -0.12832** 0.0035 -0.08295  1 if player is a woman 
(0.055) (0.070) (0.071) (0.060) (0.042) (0.062) 
0.15579*** 0.045   (0.013)  (0.076)  0.050   0.082   1 if player has complete secondary education 
(0.055) (0.067) (0.063) (0.069) (0.054) (0.073) 
0.16729** -0.0028  0.01497  -0.01539  0.0481  -0.01756  1 if player has more than complete secondary education 
(0.068) (0.090) (0.066) (0.087) (0.051) (0.060) 
-0.03384 -0.00024  0.16664**  -0.00365  0.06262  0.00914  1 if player belongs to middle socioeconomic level 
(0.053) (0.048) (0.080) (0.066) (0.042) (0.049) 
0.0268  0.05933 0.09945 0.04292 0.04252 0.07679  1 if player belongs to high socioeconomic level 
(0.067) (0.060) (0.080) (0.077) (0.042) (0.068) 
Matched Players’ characteristics                   
0.08163 0.01507 -0.12903 0.0498  0.03872 0.00589  1 if matched player is a woman 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.083) (0.072) (0.045) (0.068) 
-0.0297 0.07545  0.20149*  -0.03866  -0.06227  0.04622  1 if player and match are women 
(0.075) (0.091) (0.102) (0.083) (0.059) (0.087) 
0.00002 0.00268 0.00023 0.00038 0.00001 0.00011  Difference of age between player and match 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.10971** -0.00464 -0.04645 -0.02437  0.01107  0.07917  1 if player’s education level is higher than match 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.068) 
-0.06853 -0.03403 0.00591 -0.01426  0.04072  0.02742  1 if player’s education level is below than match 
(0.057) (0.085) (0.059) (0.081) (0.036) (0.055) 
0.10079* 0.08087* -0.16131* 0.01848  -0.06088 -0.10559* 1 if player’s socioeconomic level is above than match 
(0.057) (0.048) (0.089) (0.053) (0.046) (0.057) 
-0.00562 -0.02582 0.03598  0.05807  -0.02927 -0.07674  1 if player’s socioeconomic level is below than match 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.059) (0.072) (0.039) (0.047) 
Experimental variables                   
0.17032** 0.64552*** 0.23934**  0.10424  0.43908*** 0.22693  % expected by player 1 
(0.083) (0.111) (0.110) (0.102) (0.098) (0.138) 
0.15986*** 0.1158 -0.0795  0.03375 0.03299  0.02463  Player has mid risk aversion 
(0.060) (0.071) (0.083) (0.058) (0.055) (0.066) 
0.04835 0.06089 -0.02572  -0.00218 -0.06529  0.08869  Player has high risk aversion 
(0.054) (0.060) (0.087) (0.061) (0.051) (0.059) 
-0.00685 0.21392*  0.51450*** 0.45475***  0.29387*** 0.18545  Constant 
(0.118) (0.127) (0.106) (0.145) (0.074) (0.118) 
Observations  270 240 228 262 280 185 
R-squared  0.143 0.235 0.179 0.117 0.212 0.173 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses after OLS estimation. Base categories are less than complete secondary 
education, low socioeconomic level, player and match have the same education level, player and match have the 
same socioeconomic level, and low risk aversion. There are three education levels: less than complete secondary 
education, complete secondary education and more than complete secondary education.   38
Table 12. Results Trust Game, Player 2 
 
   Dependent variable: return amount from Player 2 (% of possible amount) 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose 
Participant’s characteristics                   
-0.0001 0.00280** 0.0030  0.0020 0.00227*** 0.0003  Player’s age 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.0403 -0.0048 -0.0570 0.0036  -0.0164  0.0203  1 if player is a woman 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.046) (0.035) (0.028) (0.044) 
0.015   (0.006)  (0.051)  0.045   (0.046)  0.010   1 if player has complete secondary education 
(0.026) (0.029) (0.049) (0.040) (0.028) (0.077) 
0.0114  -0.0467  -0.11014*  0.0301 0.0257 0.0491  1 if player has more than complete secondary education 
(0.031) (0.044) (0.066) (0.049) (0.028) (0.064) 
-0.0037 0.05945*** 0.11339** -0.0282  0.0024  0.12748*** 1 if player belongs to middle socioeconomic level 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.052) (0.029) (0.026) (0.048) 
0.0209  0.08190*** 0.0322 -0.0069 -0.0045 0.0321  1 if player belongs to high socioeconomic level 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.062) (0.041) (0.029) (0.062) 
Matched Player’s characteristics                   
0.0095 0.05563* 0.0389 0.06748*  -0.06206** 0.0238  1 if matched player is a woman 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.069) (0.036) (0.026) (0.045) 
-0.0008 -0.0447 0.0413  -0.08683* 0.0019  -0.0390  1 if player and match are women 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.084) (0.049) (0.037) (0.062) 
-0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0006  -0.0008  0.0002  Difference of age between player and match 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.0069 0.0053  0.11172*** 0.0033 -0.0021 0.0210  1 if player’s education level is higher than match 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.043) (0.026) (0.025) (0.065) 
0.0377 0.0118 -0.0090 0.0289  0.0071  -0.07229** 1 if player’s education level is lower than match 
(0.027) (0.041) (0.055) (0.042) (0.025) (0.030) 
0.0080 -0.0019 0.0424 -0.0224 -0.0004 0.0264  1 if player’s socioeconomic level is higher than match 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.063) (0.029) (0.027) (0.045) 
-0.0316 -0.0221  0.12229** -0.0252  0.0362  0.0564  1 if player’s socioeconomic level is lower than match 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.053) (0.036) (0.026) (0.048) 
Experimental variables                   
0.20232*** 0.17847*** 0.30491*** 0.25203*** 0.18722*** 0.19856*** % expected by player 2 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.073) (0.054) (0.036) (0.058) 
0.06520** 0.0456 0.17648** -0.0175  -0.0226  0.0022  % sent by player 1 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.070) (0.040) (0.041) (0.050) 
0.07901*  0.0181 -0.0284 0.1028  0.14388*** 0.0654  Constant 
(0.046) (0.060) (0.079) (0.077) (0.044) (0.060) 
Observations  1,410 1,260 1,172 1,365 1,464  940 
Number  of  players  282 252 234 273 293 188 
R-squared  0.155 0.16 0.305 0.167 0.114 0.144 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses after OLS estimation. Base categories are less than 
complete secondary education, low socioeconomic level, player and match have the same education level, and 
player and match have the same socioeconomic level. There are three education levels: less than complete secondary 
education, complete secondary education and more than complete secondary education. 
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Table 13. Group Formation Results, VCM Game 
 
   Dependent variable: 1 if player contributed to group account 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose 
Participant’s characteristics                   
-0.00042 0.00238 0.00511*  0.00265**  0.00339*** -0.00048  Player’s age 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.0227  0.02098 0.13851**  -0.02031 -0.02845 -0.01713  1 if player is a woman 
(0.017) (0.062) (0.068) (0.056) (0.049) (0.045) 
-0.03307 -0.0559  -0.24915** -0.09572 -0.06112 0.06774  1 if player has complete secondary education 
(0.023) (0.044) (0.120) (0.075) (0.076) (0.089) 
0.016   -0.09010** -0.32890*** (0.032)  0.09350*  (0.007)  1 if player has more than complete secondary education 
(0.034) (0.044) (0.090) (0.076) (0.049) (0.052) 
0.0284 -0.00263 0.06033 -0.0621 0.01964 -0.03282  1 if player belongs to middle socioeconomic level 
(0.034) (0.059) (0.116) (0.063) (0.054) (0.054) 
0.01506 0.13302* 0.06379 -0.11566*  -0.09613* 0.04354  1 if player belongs to high socioeconomic level 
(0.059) (0.079) (0.119) (0.059) (0.058) (0.069) 
Session characteristics                   
0.00144 -0.00021 0.00048  -0.00367**  -0.00152 0.00352*  % of women in session 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
-0.00009 0.00196 -0.00954* 0.00232 -0.00048  -2.E-04  % with less than complete secondary in session 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.00028 -0.00178 -0.00198 -0.00007 -0.00068  -0.00217** % that belong to low socioeconomic level in session 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.00151 0.01348*** 0.0066  -0.00289  0.00728  0.00302  Number of players in session 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
-0.00823 -0.07122 -0.00324 -0.04959* -0.03428  0.01589  Std Dev of years of education within session 
(0.012) (0.074) (0.113) (0.028) (0.040) (0.024) 
Experimental variables                   
0.16104*** 0.18294*** 0.29602*** 0.17482*** 0.12278*** 0.19011*** 1 if participant pooled risk 
(0.029) (0.055) (0.069) (0.049) (0.036) (0.038) 
0.00244*** 0.00474*** 0.01172*** 0.00322** 0.00685*** 0.00553*** % of expected contributors to VCM in session 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.01734 0.13566* 0.04636  0.10663  0.05479 -0.07985*  Player has mid risk aversion 
(0.039) (0.080) (0.108) (0.124) (0.069) (0.046) 
0.02547 0.10918  0.35121*** 0.10253 0.04257 -0.02559  Player has high risk aversion 
(0.029) (0.075) (0.119) (0.074) (0.061) (0.056) 
Observations  565   490   482   541   574   417  
Number of clusters  28  25  25  25  28  19 
Pseudo R-squared  0.295  0.192  0.318  0.136  0.209  0.25 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses after probit estimation. Base 
categories are less than complete secondary education, low socioeconomic level, and low risk aversion. There are 
three education levels: less than complete secondary education, complete secondary education and more than 
complete secondary education. 
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Table 14. Group Formation Results, Risk Pooling Game 
 
   Dependent variable: 1 if player pooled risk 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo San Jose 
Participant’s characteristics                   
0.00345 0.00343** 0.00048  0.00272  0.00411*** 0.00601** Player’s age 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
-0.00607 -0.09782 -0.02666 0.03709  0.05346 -0.00547  1 if player is a woman 
(0.048) (0.068) (0.082) (0.070) (0.046) (0.058) 
(0.006)  0.039   0.098   (0.109)  0.034   -0.17204*  1 if player has complete secondary education 
(0.092) (0.090) (0.098) (0.097) (0.075) (0.104) 
0.01838 0.0487 0.0452  -0.18009  0.10708*  0.00198  1 if player has more than complete secondary education 
(0.084) (0.097) (0.106) (0.112) (0.056) (0.099) 
-0.04265 -0.06581 0.13114 0.14991  0.07752  0.04619  1 if player belongs to middle socioeconomic level 
(0.076) (0.093) (0.108) (0.099) (0.064) (0.151) 
-0.06748 -0.0528 0.02325 0.01543 0.01483 0.10058  1 if player belongs to high socioeconomic level 
(0.059) (0.101) (0.151) (0.120) (0.081) (0.146) 
Session characteristics                   
0.00455* -0.00511 -0.0028  0.00047 0.00443** 0.00073  % of women in session 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
-0.00333*** -0.00034 -0.00364 -0.00062  0.00101  -0.00096  % with less than complete secondary in session 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
-0.00129 0.00157 -0.00121  -0.00044 0.00094 0.00033  % that belong to low socioeconomic level in session 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
-0.00903 0.00247 -0.00118  -0.01177**  -0.00344 -0.00204  Number of players in session 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.01331 0.13736 0.0744 -0.05509 0.0028 0.10328*  Std Dev of years of education within session 
(0.031) (0.146) (0.157) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) 
Experimental variables                   
0.49523*** 0.28436*** 0.28783*** 0.26584*** 0.20292*** 0.34764*** 1 if participant contributed to group account in VCM 
(0.048) (0.073) (0.085) (0.062) (0.046) (0.056) 
0.11101 0.09057 0.2081 0.01265 -0.01276  0.14027*  Player has mid risk aversion 
(0.082) (0.111) (0.141) (0.132) (0.087) (0.075) 
0.08684 0.12687 0.06191 0.03433 0.00638 0.01233  Player has high risk aversion 
(0.084) (0.098) (0.170) (0.099) (0.063) (0.093) 
Observations  567   494   484   541   580   417  
Number of clusters  28  25  25  25  28  19 
Pseudo R-squared  0.128  0.0897  0.0999  0.0735  0.0651  0.135 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses after probit estimation. Base 
categories are less than complete secondary education, low socioeconomic level, and low risk aversion. There are 
three education levels: less than complete secondary education, complete secondary education and more than 
complete secondary education. 